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But O'Malley, J., of the Appellate Division, in his dissenting
opinion makes no effort to distort the obvious meaning expressed by
the simple language of the statute, and his conclusion is supported
not only by a resum6 of decided cases, but by a simple and convinc-
ing analysis of the grammatical construction of the statute.3 7  This
opinion, confirmed by Kellogg, J., of the Court of Appeals, 38 dis-
perses all doubt that the transactions by the plaintiff in the case at
bar were wholly in defiance of clearly written statutes-statutes
which have been repeatedly re-enacted in order to secure the public
from any unscrupulous corporations who make a practice of such
illegal discounting of notes and which are susceptible of but one
interpretation.
ROBERT D. FLEMING.
EFFECT OF FALSITY OF MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN AN
INSURANCE POLICY.
It is an elementary rule of agency that notice acquired by an
agent during the transaction which it affects, binds the principal as
fully as if he acquired the notice in person, even though the agent
does not in fact inform the principal.' An exception is made to
this rule where an agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud his prin-
cipal. In such a case the presumption that the agent will com-
municate all material facts to his principal no longer prevails, and
the principal is not bound by the knowledge acquired by his agent
while engaged in such fraudulent purpose.2
Another important exception to the general rule stated is brought
about, in New York, by section 58 of the Insurance Law.3 This
section states that the policy and anything attached thereto consti-
' Supra note 11.
'S rpra note 4.
'Jefferson County Bank v. Dewey, 197 N. Y. 14, 90 N. E. 113 (1909);
Small v. Housman, 208 N. Y. 115, 101 N. E. 700 (1913); Corrigan v. Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 228 N. Y. 58, 126 N. E. 260 (1920).
' Natl. Life Insurance Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144 (1873); Crooks v.
Peoples Natl. Bank, 177 N. Y. 68, 69 N. E. 228 (1903); Prudential Insur-
ance Company v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, 227 N. Y. 510, 125 N. E. 824
(1920).
"Every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the state on or
after the first day of January, 1907, by any life insurance corporation doing
business within the state shall contain the entire contract between the parties
and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any constitution.
by-laws, rules, application or other writings unless the same are endorsed
upon or attached to the policy when issued, and all statements purporting to
be made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representa-
tions and not warranties. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall
be void."
NOTES AND COMMENT
tutes the entire contract between the insured and the insurer, and
that statements made by the insured shall be representations and
not warranties. By this section nothing which the agent knows can
be charged to the principal unless such knowledge is incorporated
in or attached to the policy and made a part thereof. This section
does not, of course, affect the general rule that statements of the
insured relating to his health and physical condition, when included
in the policy, are material to the risk, and if false are fatal to the
policy.
4
Prior to the passage of the Insurance Law 5 the case of Sterna-
man v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 6 was authority for
the proposition that knowledge to the agent was knowledge to the
insurer. In that case the insured, in his examination for insurance,
answered all the questions asked of him by the examiner for the
defendant company. The answers were truthfully given, but the
examiner omitted to record important parts of them, stating that
they were unimportant. In an action on the policy the Court per-
mitted the beneficiary to show the answers actually given to the ex-
aminer. As a result, the claim of forfeiture made by the insurance
company on account of the falsity of the answers as recorded was
held untenable, and the plaintiff was permitted to recover. The
holding in this case was abolished by the enactment of'section 58,
and the rule that knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the prin-
cipal was completely abrogated. 7
Apparently this section was introduced into the Insurance Law
to end certain stratagems practiced by insurance companies which
were prejudicial to the insured. Prior to 1907 any breach of war-
ranty contained in an application for life insurance constituted a
defense to a claim on a policy.8 This was so in spite of the fact
that the warranty might be entirely immaterial to the risk assumed
by the insurer.9 Since the insured usually had no copy of his ap-
plication for insurance and no incentive or opportunity to examine
or correct any errors in the application arising throfigh mistake,
carelessness, or ignorance, he or his beneficiary rarely became aware
of the errors until after payment of premiums for a period of
years.10 When a claim was submitted, the beneficiary, for the first
time, became aware of the fact that some error had been commit-
ted. If the application stated that all answers were warranties, the
'4 Cooleys' Briefs on Insurance (1927), p. 3268.
N. Y. Laws of 1906, Ch. 326.
170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763 (1902).
It should be noted that this section applies only to life insurance com-
panies. Baumann v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 225 N. Y. 480, 122
N. E. 628 (1919).
'Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works v. Travelers Insurance Co., 234 N. Y.
441, 138 N. E. 401, 26 A. L. R. 1505 (1923).
*Supra note 8.
"' Archer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S.. 169 App. Div. 43,
154 N. Y. Supp. 519 (1st Dept. 1915), aff'd 218 N. Y. 18, 112 N. E. 433 (1916).
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insurance company might resist payment of the claim on this war-
ranty clause. Section 58 favored the insured in that the insured's
statements to the insurer were to be considered representations and
not warranties as theretofore had been the rule. The distinction
between a representation and a warranty in an insurance contract
is that a warranty must be literally true while a representation need
only be substantially true. 1
The section, by judicial interpretation, has proved a benefit not
only to the insured, but also to the insurance companies. In Archer
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S., the Court said:
"The legislative intent * * * is to require insurance com-
panies when issuing policies to set out therein the entire con-
tract of insurance, and every statement or representation which
induced the company to enter into the agreement and upon
which it relied in so doing, if thereafter to be available as a
defense to the policy is to be annexed and made a part of
it." 12
In New York no matter what the insured tells the agent of
the insurance company, the insurer is not bound by such statements
unless they are incorporated into the policy or affixed thereto, and,
even then, any misrepresentation to avoid a policy must be material
to the risk. Thus, in this type of case, the rule that knowledge of
the agent is knowledge of the principal is not applicable.
A number of States still adhere to the common law rule enun-
ciated in the Sternaman case. For example, in Tennessee 13 an
applicant in his application for insurance truthfully answered all
questions propounded by the insurer's physician. The physician in-
n 4 R. C. L. 1027.
'. Supra note 10 at 46, 47, 154 N. Y. Supp. at 521, 522.
Hale v. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W., 143 Tenn. 555, 226 S. W. 1045(1921) ; cf. Hutchins v. Globe Life Insurance Co., 126 Ark. 360, 190 S. W. 446(1916), wherein it was held that where the examining physician knew that
the application answers he wrote down for an illiterate insured were false
the company cannot set their falsity as breach of warranty.
Northern Assurance Co. v. Kelly, 217 Mich. 1, 185 N. W. 782 (1921),
which held where insured told agent of a certain operation he had and the
agent failed to insert such information in the application, such omission to
insert facts was immaterial.
Security Benefit Assn. v. Green, 103 Okla. 284, 229 Pac. 1061 (1924),
which held that where the life insurance agent deduces and writes in the ap-
plication erroneous answers to truthfully answered questions the beneficiary
may show true facts of insured's warranty.
Lindstrom v. National Life Insurance Co. of U. S., 84 Ore. 588, 165 Pac.
675 (1917), which held that if applicant for life insurance makes truthful
statements to the medical examiner, who changes the application to make it
appear that the insured is a safe risk, the insurer will be liable on the policy
issued.
Fayetteville Mutual Benefit Assn. v. Tate, 164 Ark. 317, 261 S. W. 634(1924), which held that insurer cannot escape liability on ground of false
statements inserted in the application by its soliciting agent as to insured's age
and state of health, if insured correctly stated facts to agent.
NOTES AND COMMENT
serted false statements, making a false report to the insurer. A
policy was issued. In an action on the policy the Court denied the
insurance company the right to prove the false report of the ex-
aminer, imputing the physician's knowledge to the insurer. The
ruling in this case is directly contra the law in New York.
If the above case had occurred in New York and it could be
shown that the misrepresentations had been material to the risk,
then under section 58 the Court would have found for the insurance
company. This state guards the insurance companies against false
reports made to them by agents and examiners by that part of sec-
tion 58 which states, "Every policy * * * shall contain the entire
contract between the parties, and nothing shall be incorporated there-
in * ** unless the same are endorsed upon or attached to the policy
when issued * * *." By this phrase, if a copy of the application
is attached to the policy and the answers contained therein are false,
- the insured is bound by such answers even though he answered them
correctly to the examiner or agent of the insurance company.
A recent New York case, Minsker v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Company, 14 set forth the rule that when an insured
receives a policy it is his duty to read it, or have it read, and if
an application incorporated therein does not contain correct answers
to the questions asked by the medical examiner, it is his duty to
have it corrected. 15
"In such circumstances a recovery will no-longer be
permitted because the medical examiner incorrectly recorded
the applicant's answers or because the insured was unable to
read or neglected to read the policy." 16
In this case the plaintiff beneficiary under her husband's life in-
surance policy, upon his death, brought an action on the policy for
$10,000. The defendant life insurance company denied liability on
the ground that the plaintiff's husband gave false answers to the
questions in regard to previous consultations with and treatment by
physicians. Plaintiff contended that the answers to such questions
were truthfully made to the defendant's local agent and medical ex-
aminer, and that they had full knowledge of the facts, altlough the
answers as contained in the written application were found to be
false. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was not deceived
and the. representations though material were not fraudulent. The
Court found for the defendant and stated that the plaintiff was
bound by the answers as written, since the application was physi-
12 254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4 (1930); See (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev.
126.
Contra Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Brown, 34 Ga. App.
301, 129 S. E. 307 (1925), wherein it was held that an applicant for life
insurance has the right to rely on discharge by examiner of duty to properly
report answers to insurer and the insured has no duty afterwards to examine
his policy to ascertain on what representations it was issued.
" Supra note 14 at 338, 339, 73 N. E. at 5.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
cally annexed to the policy. Being a part of the policy, the Court
said the statements had at least the effect of erroneous and ma-
terial representations under the rule at common law.
The rule in New York is not unreasonably severe and is in
line with the true nature of life insurance. Life insurance is es-
sentially a co-operative effort to distribute among the many the
economic loss of untimely death which otherwise would be borne
by the few. It is a unique contract in that it contemplates a tri-
angular relationship instead of the usual bilateral one. It creates
not alone the reciprocal obligations of insured and insurer, but is
founded on the relationship of each policyholder to his fellow policy
holders. Under the plan of participating life insurance so generally
in use today, the mortality of the group is the concern of the in-
dividual in the form of increased or decreased dividends. Thus,
legislation which in its inception regarded only the primary con-
tract of life insurance-that between the insured and the insurance
company-finds additional justification in the real benefit which it
confers on the secondary contractual relationship and the true basis
of life insurance-that of each policy-holder to his fellow policy-
holders. By abrogating the common-law rule that knowledge to the
agent is binding on his principal, New York has in effect relieved
bona fide policy-holders of the cost of unjust death losses which
formerly would be imposed on them.
It is noteworthy that seven States have adopted laws which
in substance fulfill the aim of the New York statute to the effect
that statements made by the insured are to be considered as repre-
sentations and not warranties and that twenty-one States have
passed statutes which aim to guard against technical forfeiture by
providing that misrepresentations shall not nullify the contract un-
less made in matters 'material to the risk.1 7  However, it would
seem that the difficulties and wide divergence in rulings of the vari-
ous state courts can only be eliminated by a uniform insurance law.
While it is fully appreciated that any attempt at universal reform
in the United States must surmount great difficulties, we can point
to at least one instance where all States have agreed on a uniform
law.' 8 Only by such legislation can both policy holders and in-
surers be assured of uniformity in the exercise of rights and powers
despite diversity of jurisdiction.
RAYMOND C. WILLIAMS.
'Huebner, Principles of Life Insurance (1919), p. 338.
'Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law; Taft, Law Reform (1926), p.
20, "Over 25 years ago the American Bar Assn. inaugurated a movement
to ameliorate the inconvenience caused by this situation (Difference in state
rulings). At its suggestion Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were
appointed by the governors of the several states * * *. Thirty acts have been
devised or approved by the Commissioners and a number, of these have been
enacted. Thus 51 states have enacted the Negotiable Instruments Law, 26
the Bill of Ladings Law, 18 the Desertion and Non-Support Law, 12 the
Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 13 the Limited Partnership Law, 16 the Part-
nership Law. 27 the Sales Act, 18 the Stock Transfer Act, and 41 the Ware-
house Receipts Act."
